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Overcoming Institutional Voids:  
A Reputation-Based View of Long Run Survival 
 
 
 
Research Summary: Emerging markets are characterized by underdeveloped institutions and 
frequent environmental shifts. Yet they also contain many firms that have survived over 
generations. How are firms in weak institutional environments able to persist over time? 
Motivated by 69 interviews with leaders of emerging market firms with histories spanning 
generations, we combine induction and deduction to propose reputation as a meta-resource that 
allows firms to activate their conventional resources. We conceptualize reputation as consisting 
of prominence, perceived quality, and resilience, and develop a process model that illustrates the 
mechanisms that allow reputation to facilitate survival in ways that persist over time. Building on 
research in strategy and business history, we thus shed light on an underappreciated strategic 
construct (reputation) in an under-theorized setting (emerging markets) over an unusual period 
(the historical long run).  
 
Managerial Summary: Why are some firms able to persistently survive in challenging, 
uncertain, and underdeveloped business environments? To explore this question, we analyze in-
depth interviews with leaders of emerging market firms that have survived over decades and 
even centuries. We find that firm reputation is a key strategic driver, and propose new ideas 
about the ways reputation facilitates survival. We elaborate how a favorable reputation allows a 
firm to more fully utilize its existing resources by decreasing uncertainty. We also propose that 
reputation has offensive and defensive properties that make it valuable to firms during both 
positive and negative economic cycles. Finally, we discuss why a reputation-based source of 
competitive advantage is hard to imitate, and outline three general approaches for building 
reputation.  
 
 
Keywords: Emerging Markets, Institutional Voids, Reputation, Business History, Intangible 
Resources 
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INTRODUCTION  
Emerging markets are characterized by institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). To 
survive and thrive over time, firms operating in these markets must respond to unpredictable 
(but predictably frequent) shocks―political instability, violence, macroeconomic 
fluctuations, and even war―without the benefit of specialized intermediaries that can analyze 
market information, facilitate transactions, and provide signals of credibility (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Doing so can be difficult and failure rates are high; 
for instance, emerging market banks had an estimated failure rate of 25 percent over a seven 
year period in the 1990s (Brown and Dinc, 2005). Nonetheless, emerging markets are rife 
with examples of firms and business groups that have survived over decades, generations, 
and even centuries. For example, Grupo Bimbo, founded in Mexico in the 1940s, endured 
national and international turbulence to emerge as one of the world’s largest bakeries; Tata 
Group was founded in 1868 and developed into a leading Indian business group despite 
facing colonialism, rebellions, and major social transformations; and Koç Holding, founded 
in 1926, survived numerous national and regional crises to maintain its foothold as Turkey’s 
leading business group. Emerging markets thus present researchers with a puzzle: How are 
firms competing in such weak institutional environments able to persist across time? 
Research in strategy has increasingly focused on the relationship between institutions 
and firm outcomes, proposing that effective strategies depend on and vary across different 
institutional environments (e.g. Ahuja and Yayavaram, 2011; Garcia-Canal and Guillen, 
2008; Hiatt and Sine, 2014; Marquis and Raynard, 2015; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, and Chen, 
2009). Scholars have argued that institutions are more than just background conditions 
(Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009), and directly influence the strategic actions 
available to an organization (Ingram and Silverman, 2002). In this view, firms can achieve 
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and sustain competitive advantage through strategies that overcome, shape, and capitalize on 
the nature of their institutional environments (Marquis and Raynard, 2015).  
Strategies that account for institutional environments might be especially important in 
emerging markets (Hiatt and Sine, 2014). Emerging markets are replete with institutional 
voids: they lack institutions that can help facilitate market transactions (Khanna and Palepu, 
2010). Banks cannot always ensure access to credit; courts cannot guarantee the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights; auditors cannot reliably certify a firm’s financial operations. 
As a result, the demands, constraints, and challenges facing firms in emerging markets are 
different than those facing their counterparts in mature markets. Theories and findings from 
developed market settings are not necessarily applicable in emerging market contexts 
(Khanna, 2014; Marquis and Raynard, 2015). Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat, and Mitchell 
(2014: 3) thus argued that there are “clear opportunities” to develop new theory for 
institutionally-underdeveloped settings in order to expand our understanding of “world-wide 
strategic management.” This paper builds on one such opportunity.  
Motivated by a set of 69 publicly available interviews with the founders and leaders 
of firms with histories spanning generations in emerging markets across continents, we 
combine induction with deductive reasoning to propose theory on how firms competing in 
institutionally weak settings are able to survive over the long run. Through an inductive-
deductive theory-building process (c.f. Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007), we propose firm reputation 
as a key strategic construct in these settings. Driven by our data, we propose that in emerging 
markets, reputation consists of three elements: prominence, perceived quality, and resilience. 
The first two elements―prominence and perceived quality―have been established by 
research in developed markets (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, and Sever, 2005). We extend 
this definition by proposing that a previously untheorized component―resilience (beliefs 
about a firm’s ability to withstand shocks)―is essential in emerging markets. Our emerging 
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markets research context allowed us to inductively uncover the importance of resilience, as 
the lack of institutional intermediaries in such settings sharply illuminated its significance. 
Particularly, in settings where a firm’s survival cannot be taken for granted, and where 
institutional intermediaries cannot guarantee remediation, the belief that a firm will survive 
crises to fulfill its obligations is critical in driving stakeholder actions. Thus, by focusing on 
the context of emerging markets, we both build on and extend existing theory on the meaning 
of reputation.  
We also propose a process model that illustrates the mechanisms that allow reputation 
to facilitate long-term survival. Because emerging markets feature institutional voids that 
hinder potential transaction partners from credibly signaling, accessing, and validating 
relevant information, a key structural feature that deters welfare-enhancing transactions 
between two parties is potential transaction uncertainty. In developed markets, counterparties 
can rely on mature institutions to decrease uncertainty and hedge against transactional risks, 
both by guaranteeing quality ex-ante, and by providing remediation ex-post. We propose that, 
when institutional credibility enhancers and adjudicators are not present, a firm’s reputation 
can provide transactional confidence. This, in turn, can increase the quantity of profit-reaping 
transactions, allowing the firm to activate its conventional resources. This suggests that, in 
emerging markets, a positive reputation has cumulative effects: although a favorable 
reputation is difficult to acquire (and might even develop by chance), it can generate 
cascading positive feedback loops that can act as a source of sustained survival. We thus 
propose that reputation is a meta-resource, highlighting its higher-order ability to activate and 
moderate other resources (analogous to meta-routines
1
 and meta-knowledge
2
).     
                                                          
1
 Higher-order routines for changing conventional routines; see Feldman and Pentland (2003). 
2
 Knowledge used to differentiate between the hierarchical levels of knowledge types; see Evans and Foster 
(2011). 
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Our process model has implications for theory and practice. We contribute to research 
on emerging markets (e.g. Guillen, 2000; Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014; Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung, 2013; Mair, Martí, and Ventresca, 2012; Siegel, 2007) by 
proposing reputation as a meta-resource that can help firms mitigate and capitalize on 
institutional voids to attain longevity. We also add to research on reputation as a strategic 
asset (e.g., Rindova et al., 2005). By deconstructing reputation into three components, 
theorizing the importance of resilience, and elaborating the mechanisms that connect 
reputation to survival, we build new theory on how this intangible asset might affect firm 
outcomes. More generally, our conceptualization of reputation augments theories of strategy 
suggesting that, in uncertain environments, successful firms enact continuous change (e.g. 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2009; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). We propose 
that in environments characterized by institutional voids, reputation provides the stakeholder 
buy-in that enables firms to engage in change.  
We thus position reputation as a central concept at the intersection of strategy and 
emerging markets theory. By proposing a baseline theory of how reputation might affect 
survival, we hope to inspire future research that extends, refines, tests, and challenges our 
hypotheses. For instance, although our data illuminated the importance and inter-related 
nature of three components of reputation―prominence, perceived quality, and resilience―it 
did not allow us to disentangle the individual effects of these components. We thus focus our 
theorizing on the impact of reputation as a holistic construct, and hope to motivate research 
on whether and how these features are connected, conflicting, or reinforcing in driving 
outcomes in emerging market settings. Similarly, by focusing on long-lived firms in 
emerging markets, we propose mechanisms that connect reputation to survival for firms 
across both negative and positive economic cycles. We hope that future research on a larger 
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sample of firms will build on these ideas to test whether (and how) more or less (favorable) 
reputation is connected to firm success or failure.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we describe current theory 
on emerging markets. Next, we provide an overview of the relevant literature on reputation. 
We then outline the methods―an inductive-deductive approach―underlying our theory 
development. We develop a process model and a series of propositions, illustrated with 
interview quotes, that position reputation as a meta-resource that allows firms to mitigate and 
capitalize on institutional voids over time. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
these propositions for research in strategy. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS OF EMERGING MARKETS  
Definitions of emerging markets vary. The term was first used by the International Finance 
Corporation in the early 1980s to promote mutual fund investments in developing countries 
(Van Agtmael, 2007). Since then, various criteria have been used to define emerging markets, 
including GDP levels, poverty rates, stages of capital market development, and growth 
potential (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000). Regardless of definition, emerging 
markets represent an important part of the global economic system: in the past 50 years, 
emerging markets have nearly doubled their share of world GDP, investment, trade, and 
private consumption.
3
 Advancing academic theory and knowledge of this setting has never 
been more relevant. 
 We follow Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2010) in defining emerging markets as 
“transactional arenas” where counterparties cannot easily or efficiently come together due to 
the absence of specialized intermediaries that support and facilitate transactions between 
buyers and sellers. Examples of such intermediaries include credibility enhancers (including 
auditors and third-party certifications), information analyzers (including credit ratings and 
                                                          
3
 Rachman G. 2014. The future still belongs to the emerging markets. Financial Times 3 February.  
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Consumer Reports ratings), aggregators and distributors that provide low cost matching 
services (including  banks, trading companies, and labor unions), transaction facilitators 
(including equity exchanges and platforms such as eBay), and adjudicators  and regulators 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2010). These intermediaries are crucial for facilitating transactions in all 
markets, because information asymmetry and anticipation of transaction difficulties 
discourage contracting and exchange. Their absence results in high uncertainty: it is easier to 
engage in corruption or theft in an environment that lacks functional governance structures, 
independent checks and balances, transparent reporting standards, and efficient judicial 
adjudication systems (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Lack of effective political, governance, and 
regulatory institutions also increases the probability of instability and unrest in the very basic 
foundations of economic life, which further exacerbates the constraints to exchange. Hence, 
we define markets as “emerging” when institutional voids (an absence of intermediaries) 
leaves participants struggling to find ways to bring buyers and sellers together to engage in 
mutually productive exchange. 
Our definition of emerging markets allows us to theorize beyond simply “developing 
countries,” which research often equates with emerging markets, to all markets that have 
structural deficiencies due to institutional voids. While a majority of emerging markets today 
are located in developing countries, many contemporary advanced economies were once 
themselves emerging markets. An additional advantage of defining emerging markets in 
structural terms is that doing so allows us to avoid problems of tautology (defining emerging 
markets as emerging because they have not yet “emerged”), while also allowing for a variety 
of emerging market forms (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). That is, we conceptualize markets as 
falling along a continuum featuring different degrees of emergence: at one end, 
“dysfunctional” markets have an extreme degree of institutional voids, while at the other end, 
“developed” markets feature few institutional voids.  
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Strategy research on emerging markets has focused primarily on uncovering the 
drivers of short-term competitive advantage. One body of research has argued that when 
institutions are incomplete, incumbents, including business groups, dominate (e.g., Guillen, 
2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung, 2005), although 
there is debate regarding whether this advantage is driven by value creation (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007) or value extraction such as tunneling or corruption (Morck, Wolfenzon, and 
Yeung, 2005). A related body of work has argued that dominant incumbents can gain 
competitive advantage through nonmarket actions that can mitigate political hazards, 
including lobbying (Choi, Jia, and Lu, 2014), stakeholder engagement (Henisz et al., 2014), 
and corporate social responsibility (Marquis and Qian, 2013). Network-based studies have 
examined the effect of political ties on outcomes (Zhu and Chung, 2014), and how such 
effects are moderated by institutional maturity (Shi, Markoczy, and Stan, 2014) and regime 
shocks (Siegel, 2007) that can transform network contacts from assets into liabilities.  
While these studies have illuminated some of the factors associated with competitive 
advantage in emerging markets over the short or medium term, the drivers of long term 
survival remain comparatively undertheorized. For example, Khanna and Rivkin’s (2001) 
analysis of business groups showing a positive association between group affiliation and 
performance was based on a dataset spanning approximately a decade. Henisz et al.’s (2014) 
study on stakeholder engagement employs a dataset spanning 15 years, one of the longest 
time spans for quantitative studies on this topic. There is little theory on whether mechanisms 
of competitive advantage are sustainable, replicable, and relevant to survival that persists 
over generations and centuries. As Jones and Khanna (2006) argued, for emerging market 
firms, history matters: their survival is dependent on factors and processes that allow them to 
endure shocks and crises over the long run. We therefore ask: how are some firms in 
emerging markets able to survive over the long term? 
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REPUTATION IN EMERGING MARKETS 
Two primary bodies of literature have informed the definition of reputation as a strategic 
construct: an economic perspective, and an institutional perspective (Rindova et al., 2005). 
The economic perspective on reputation emphasizes its information signaling properties in 
the context of asymmetric information (Sorensen, 2014), and defines it as observers’ 
expectations about a firm’s attributes, and particularly its ability to generate high-quality 
products (Rindova et al., 2005). In this rational view, reputation is based on inferences from a 
firm’s past actions (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988), and particularly its output quality (Allen, 
1984; Clark and Montgomery, 1998; Shapiro, 1983). Complementing the economic 
perspective, the institutional perspective on reputation emphasizes the importance of social 
context. In this view, reputation comprises a set of collective beliefs about a firm, shaped 
partially through the evaluations of high-status institutions (Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova, 
2010; Raub and Weesie, 1990; Rindova et al. 2005). In this view, high-status institutions, 
including industry analysts (Zuckerman, 1999), media establishments (Pollock and Rindova, 
2003), and ratings certification contests (Rao, 1994), engage in evaluations that shape a 
firm’s reputation in the eyes of other stakeholders.  
Drawing on both definitions, most strategy research on reputation is grounded in the 
resource-based view, suggesting that valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
resources generate competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Strategy scholars have typically conceptualized reputation as one of a firm’s many intangible 
resources. For example, Hall’s (1993) taxonomy of competitive advantage argued that 
“reputation of products and company” alongside eight other intangible assets (including trade 
secrets, contracts and licenses, databases, know-how, and intellectual property rights) can 
lead to sustainable competitive advantage.  
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Research building on this view has suggested that a good reputation can strengthen 
while a bad reputation can harm a firm’s performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Roberts 
and Dowling, 2002), and that firms that invest in and manage their reputations can gain a 
competitive edge over their rivals (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009; Rindova et al. 2005). Studies 
have suggested that a favorable reputation can help a firm realize the potential of its 
resources, enhancing its ability to attract and retain strategic human capital (Turban and 
Cable, 2003), lowering its cost of capital and increasing its ability to raise financing (Stuart, 
Hoang, and Hybels, 1999), increasing its ability to choose high quality partners (Dollinger, 
Golden, and Saxton, 1997) and form alliances (Stern, Dukerich, and Zajac, 2014), and 
helping mitigate the impact of negative events (Love and Kraatz, 2009). Reputation, signaled 
through institutional intermediaries such as credibility enhancers, can also reduce transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1981) for a firm by ameliorating a transaction partner’s concerns about the 
firm’s propensity to engage in opportunism 
Antecedents of reputation include a firm’s financial performance and management 
practices (Staw and Epstein, 2000), the frequency of its market actions and complexity of its 
repertoire (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, and Derfus, 2006), its responses to layoffs and 
downsizing (Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2005), and changing management fashions 
(Bermiss, Zajac, and King, 2013). Firms can manage and exploit reputation through brands. 
To assess reputation, buyers “tend to use brand names as signals of quality and value and 
often gravitate to products with brand names they have come to associate with quality and 
value” (Herbig and Milewicz 1995: 8). Brands can even induce economies of scale in 
generating and spreading reputation; for example, a firm with a favorable reputation due to 
high quality performance in one product can transfer that positive reputation to another 
product via its brand name (Moorthy, 1985).  
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Strategy research on reputation has primarily focused on, and was developed in, the 
context of mature markets. There is limited research on how reputation functions in emerging 
markets. What dimensions of reputation are important in emerging markets? Is it one of many 
intangible resources affecting outcomes? Or does it interact with other resources in patterned 
ways that can lead to success or survival? Even the fundamental assumptions about the ways 
reputation operates are not necessarily met in settings replete with institutional voids. For 
example, is perceived quality a key dimension, as the economic view would suggest, in 
settings where a firm’s ability to abide by its agreements or withstand future shocks might be 
in question? Emerging markets by definition lack the institutional intermediaries that help 
shape collective perceptions, a core assumption of the institutional perspective on reputation 
(Rindova et al., 2005: 1034) and even of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981). 
How does reputation operate, given a lack of intermediaries such as credibility enhancers and 
information analyzers (Khanna and Palepu, 2010)?  
One area of research that has explored reputation in the context of emerging markets 
is business history. Business historians have examined emerging markets from the broad arc 
of history (e.g., Jones, 2005; Jones, 2013), and have begun to suggest the importance of 
reputation in allowing firms to achieve sustained, long run success (e.g., Kobrak, 2013; 
McKenna and Olegario, 2012; Olegario and McKenna, 2013). For instance, Jones’ (2000) 
historical analysis of British multinational trading companies from the eighteenth century to 
the present day suggested the firms’ reputations helped them withstand long run shocks and 
change their strategies over time. Connell’s (2004) research on the long run survival of the 
Jardine Matheson trading group demonstrated how the group’s reputation was leveraged to 
take advantage of various perceived opportunities. And Pak’s (2013) study on J.P. Morgan 
showed how in the early twentieth century―a time when the U.S. was an emerging 
market―J.P. Morgan’s reputation played a crucial role in facilitating transactions in private 
12 
 
banking, a secretive world characterized by little public information. However, the historical 
conceptualization of reputation as a key driver of long run survival is undertheorized in 
strategy.  
DATA AND METHODS 
We develop our contribution through an approach that combines inductive and deductive 
reasoning, an analytical process different than that typical of inductive, qualitative research 
(see Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006; Gavetti and Rivkin, 
2007 for other examples of similar methods). Our theory was motivated by an analysis of 69 
interviews with the founders and leaders of firms featuring histories spanning an average of 
73 years, in emerging markets across Central and South America, Africa, South Asia, and the 
Middle East. Inductive analysis of the interviews revealed the importance of reputation, and 
suggested initial ideas about how it might promote long term survival in emerging markets. 
However, given some limitations of the data, and the stock of existing research on reputation 
and on emerging markets, we engaged in deductive theory-building to develop a process 
model encompassing both insights from prior research and those first gleamed through the 
interviews. Our aim is building rather than testing theory: the proposed model can be further 
refined and validated empirically in future studies.  
Data  
We analyzed a set of 69 semi-structured interviews, typically ranging from one to two hours, 
publicly available as part of the “Creating Emerging Markets” project of the Business History 
Initiative at Harvard Business School.
4
 The respondents were current and former leaders at 
the CEO, Chairman, or Founder level of top emerging market firms. The mean and median 
age of both the firms and respondents in our sample at the time of interview was close to 70 
                                                          
4
 Full data citation listed in the references section. Website: http://www.hbs.edu/businesshistory/emerging-
markets    
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years (see Appendix 1 in the online supplement for a full list of firms, respondents, their 
positions, and summary statistics of the dataset).  
The firms were selected through a systematic process that started with identifying the 
top business firms in a particular emerging market. For each country, a team of academic 
researchers polled between three and ten country experts (determined by the size of the 
country) to identify a list of top firms with a living founder or elder leader that has led the 
firm for at least a decade, and in many cases, multiple decades. By “top firms,” the 
researchers referred to firms that have survived over the long run, rather than firms with the 
highest current performance in their industries. Common firms across these different lists 
were then discussed, and cross-checked with publicly available rankings of the top firms in a 
country, to generate a final list of sampled firms. During the deliberation process, the 
researchers targeted respondents over 60 years old to not only reduce respondent bias (older 
respondents could be more frank since their words no longer affected their career prospects), 
but also to capture leaders’ and firms’ responses to the many changes―both good and 
bad―that had occurred in their firms and their emerging markets over the past several 
decades. The researchers sent out interview requests to a final list of firms; remarkably, the 
requests were never declined except for logistical reasons (some interviews took several years 
to schedule and execute, sometimes due to the health issues of the respondents).  
The interviews were conducted by a set of professional academic interviewers, 
trained to follow best practices (including asking non-leading questions, and probing for 
detail where appropriate). When possible, the researchers travelled to the respondents’ offices 
to conduct the interviews so that respondents would feel at ease. The interviews began with 
open-ended questions asking the respondent to describe his or her firm’s development from 
inception to the present, focusing on the respondent’s own experiences in leading the firm. 
The questions were carefully worded in order to avoid guiding the respondent down any 
14 
 
particular path. Open-ended questions were followed-up with specific questions to explore 
the “hows” and “whys” behind each critical issue, decision, or action that the respondents 
described.  
Notably, the researchers conducting the interviews were blind to the purpose of their 
use in any future studies. This is a strength of our research design and unique in qualitative 
studies, as it reduces potential sources of interviewer bias (including by attenuating the 
possibility of confirmation bias). In particular, the interviews were conducted without a focus 
on reputation as a topic of inquiry—its importance emerged inductively from the data.   
We chose to analyze this data set for several reasons. First, the interviews—to our 
knowledge, the largest set of in-depth academic interviews with the leaders of top firms 
across the world—provided rare access to the leaders of emerging market firms. In fact, in 
many cases, these interviews were the first academic research interviews granted by the 
respondents in their entire careers. They thus provided an opportunity to draw on executives’ 
perspectives to develop theory on the mechanisms underlying firm activities in emerging 
markets, especially important given the dearth of both quantitative and qualitative data in this 
context writ large.
5
 
Second, the data provided a unique “theoretical sampling” of the top firms in 
emerging markets.
6
 The firms and respondents were chosen because of their long histories; 
they thus represent “unusually revelatory, extreme exemplars” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007: 27) of long-lived firms. Theoretical sampling – particularly of extreme cases (whether 
notable failures or successes) – is a useful tool for building theory, because it allows 
                                                          
5
 In fact, the lack of systematic data (quantitative and qualitative) was the motivator of the “Creating Emerging 
Markets” data collection project.  
6
 Theoretical sampling – that is, the selection of a set of cases based on a theoretical similarity (for instance, a 
particular organizational configuration (e.g. Battilana and Dorado, 2010), industry and firm age (e.g. Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009), and similar history of success (e.g. Dougherty and Hardy, 1996)) – is commonly employed as 
the sampling method of choice in research aimed at developing theory. Indeed, because theoretical sampling 
allows for constant comparison of the processes underlying similarities, it is considered “more important than 
statistical sampling in an exploratory qualitative study” (Kram, 1983: 611). 
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researchers to generate insights that might be obscured or absent in typical settings or in 
large-N, comparative studies (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Pratt, 2009; Eisenhardt, 
Graebner, and Sonenshein, 2016). By examining firms with long histories, including periods 
of success and failure, we hoped to uncover processes that appeared connected to survival, 
with special attention to the mechanisms that were replicated across multiple cases; our aim 
was not to propose constructs that explained variance in outcomes. This allowed us to 
respond to calls for theories on how firms can overcome, and survive, in challenging 
emerging market contexts―an underdeveloped area of research due to the challenges of 
obtaining emerging markets data.
7
  
Finally, the data provided a high level of transparency and reproducibility. Because 
the interview transcripts are available from the Business History Initiative website for direct 
download, our data is transparent and our inductive process is replicable. This is highly 
unusual in qualitative studies, since full interview transcripts and field notes are usually not 
available to other scholars.  
Of course, the nature of the data also brings up potential limitations. Despite the 
benefits of theoretical sampling, our choice to analyze firms that have survived over the long 
run might make it difficult to develop generalizable theory. However, the firms in our sample 
have experienced both successes and failures in the wide sweep of their histories. Their 
leaders’ appreciation of reputation comes from their exposure to both good and bad times. In 
the interviews, leaders often mentioned the challenges they had faced, the failures they had 
experienced, and the mistakes they had made. In other words, there was significant variation 
in performance within the firms’ individual histories, and our theory development benefitted 
                                                          
7
 On one hand, research examining top firms in this setting typically consists of teaching-oriented case studies, 
which tend to focus on determinants of success in extreme cases at a particular static point in time (e.g. 
Ghemawat 2007; Ghemawat and Siegel, 2011). On the other hand, academic work on emerging markets 
typically comprises large-N quantitative studies that focus on estimating average industry effects of a particular 
determinant of success (e.g. Douma, George, and Kabir, 2006; Henisz et al., 2014; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; 
Tan and Peng, 2003). 
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from this heterogeneity. In addition, the use of retrospective and public data brings up 
concerns about respondent bias, including retrospective bias and impression management 
(Golden, 1992). However, given the seniority of the respondents, the elapsed time between 
the interviews and the events described helped foster greater candor and openness by the 
respondents, as interviews generally no longer affected the respondents’ careers. Nonetheless, 
we addressed these concerns by combining inductive analysis with deductive theory-building, 
as elaborated below.  
Inductive data analysis 
Given the paucity of research on how firms sustain longevity in emerging markets, we began 
by engaging in inductive analysis to identify constructs that our respondents believed were 
critical for survival over time (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). We started our analysis 
with no a priori theoretical preferences or hypothesis, following the principles of a grounded 
approach (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014). Our goal was to identify within and 
across our interviews the patterns, processes, and relationships that appeared connected to 
survival. We coded the interviews, using the qualitative data analysis software QSR-NVivo to 
organize our codes, and developed an emergent set of first-order codes that appeared related 
to success across time and multiple cases. Examples of such codes include 
professionalization, diversification, political activity, and brands. We then engaged in 
repeated cycles of coding, iterating between coding and writing analytical memos, to adjust, 
refine, and cluster the first order codes into second-order theoretical categories, or themes 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008). (See Appendix 2 in the online supplement for our data structure).   
Through this process, we recognized the importance of a second-order theme we 
conceptualized as “reputation.” Although never directly asked about reputation, leaders often 
either mentioned reputation explicitly, or discussed mechanisms and processes related to firm 
prominence, perceptions of quality, and resilience. (See Appendix 3 in the online supplement 
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for examples).  After iterating between the data and existing theory, we realized that what the 
respondents were describing most closely matched theoretical conceptualizations of firm 
reputation. We sharpened our analysis to explicate an anatomy of reputation.  
Deductive theory-building process 
At this stage, given the constraints of the data and the stock of existing research on reputation 
and emerging markets, instead of developing theory by solely relying on our inductive 
analysis, we stepped beyond the interviews and engaged in a deductive theory-building 
process by synthesizing the emergent theme of reputation with the academic literature. This 
involved developing the category of reputation to deductively consider, in theoretically 
generalizable ways, how it might shape long term survival. That is, while the interviews 
motivated our focus on reputation, we developed our propositions by leveraging resource-
based theories of competitive advantage as well as a stream of research in business history 
that has suggested the importance of reputation in emerging economies in earlier historical 
periods, including the 18
th
 to 20
th
 centuries. We iterated between the interviews, findings, and 
this literature to refine our theory development. This cycle of analysis eventually resulted in 
our proposed conceptualization of reputation as a meta-resource that drives resource 
activation in emerging markets.  
A REPUTATION-BASED THEORY OF LONG RUN SURVIVAL IN EMERGING 
MARKETS  
Emerging markets are characterized by high potential transaction uncertainty. Because 
emerging markets lack intermediary institutions that provide, analyze, and certify 
information, there is great uncertainty regarding a firm’s propensity to abide by its promises, 
and even its future existence. We conceptualize reputation as a construct that provides firms 
with transactional confidence that overcomes this potential transaction uncertainty through 
both defensive and offensive mechanisms. We propose that these mechanisms increase the 
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quantity of firm transactions: defensive mechanisms can provide a firm more time to exploit 
existing business opportunities, while offensive mechanisms can allow a firm to capture new 
business opportunities. We propose that these mechanisms are valuable during both negative 
and positive economic cycles; the increased transactions they engender can allow a firm to 
activate its existing conventional resources in order to fulfill transactions. Synthesizing these 
findings, we propose that reputation functions as a meta-resource that activates and 
moderates conventional firm resources. Finally, we suggest that reputation has cumulative 
effects―driven by the difficulty of acquiring reputation and the reinforcing mechanisms at-
play once reputation is acquired―and propose that reputation can function as a potential 
source of persistent survival.  
 [  INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE  ] 
The challenge of emerging markets: potential transaction uncertainty 
Emerging markets are characterized by high levels of potential transaction uncertainty that 
can prevent economic transactions (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). For example, Arturo 
Acevedo, President of Grupo ArcelorMittal (Acindar), reflected:  
“Lack of predictability in Argentina creates uncertainty and this drives 
companies’ unwillingness to commit resources.” 
 
Across the interviews, potential transaction uncertainty generally took one of two 
main forms. One was counterparty behavioral uncertainty. A lack of information regarding 
counterparties and weak institutions for contract enforcement and adjudication created 
uncertainty regarding whether a firm would abide by the terms of an agreement, including the 
quality of the output to be exchanged, the timeliness of fulfillment, and the probability of 
reneging. This behavioral uncertainty constrained potential transactions. For example, Jose 
Grana Miró Quesada, Chairman of Graña y Montero (a Peru-based construction and real 
estate group), noted how a lack of information on whether a counterparty would submit 
payment for a potential project ultimately prevented the project from occurring. He recalled:    
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“We won a bid for a bridge…We signed the contract, but [the counterparty] 
wouldn’t make the advance payment. I remember [the President of Peru] called 
me and complained, asking why we weren’t working yet. I told him, ‘Mr. 
President, we haven’t received the down payment. How could we start working?’ 
…That bridge was never built.” 
 
In another example, Dionisio Garza Medina, Former President and CEO of Alfa 
S.A.B. (a multinational Mexican business group), recalled how a multinational business 
partner, AT&T, lost faith in its joint telecom investments in Mexico after its other partners 
ignored or obstructed the terms agreed to in contracts. There was little AT&T could do in 
response, due to the lack of independent legal institutions, an insidious institutional void:  
“[After a promised telecommunications reform] we partnered with AT&T, 
with the dream that the business was going to grow significantly…We 
invested one billion dollars between both companies…Then we realized that 
what was written in the law was not going to be enforced in real life…The 
President of AT&T said, ‘In your country I will not spend another cent, 
because laws are not enforced’ ”    
 
Another type of transaction uncertainty was environmental uncertainty: even when 
both parties to a transaction acted according to their agreements, frequent environmental 
shocks (including regulatory and political shocks, expropriation, coups, chaos, wars) still 
posed a threat. For example, Arturo Acevedo, President of Grupo ArcelorMittal―Acindar 
(the leading producer of long carbon steel in Argentina), recalled:  
“The second crisis, which I consider the toughest, was the 1978-1981 period, 
the time of the guerrilla-military war in Argentina... All plants along that strip 
were deeply affected. The guerrillas killed several of our managers and took 
over our plants, and the military would walk into our plants to get guerrilla 
fighters out. It was a terrible time.”  
 
 Because of these shocks, firms faced the risk that their operations – or the operations 
of their partners, suppliers, and buyers – would cease to exist or become severely disrupted. 
For example, Dionisio Garza Medina (CEO of Alfa S.A.B.) recalled:   
“In 1979 I was full of dreams and aspirations…In 1981, I was in technical 
bankruptcy…[This was] a period of high interest rates…Mexico suffered 
devaluation…There was high inflation; the interest rates went up from 5% to 
15%, devaluation of the peso, price controls: we [thought we] were dead!”   
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The constant possibility of debilitating environmental shocks such as negative 
regulatory actions often weighed heavily on firms in emerging markets. For example, 
Hakeem Belo-Osagie, Chairman of the Nigeria-based United Bank for Africa (one of 
Africa’s leading multinational financial institutions), emphasized how the burden of 
managing against political risks and regulatory uncertainty in the absence of institutions 
required dedicating significant organizational resources and constant attention: 
“The biggest challenge in Africa…is that you constantly have to manage… 
the regulatory agencies…Things can go horribly wrong if you do not manage 
that aspect very well.” 
 
In the examples above, the challenge for each firm, as its leaders described, was 
mitigating potential transaction uncertainty. To engage in exchanges, customers and partners 
had to believe that the firm could overcome both behavioral uncertainty (that it would act in 
accordance with agreements) and environmental uncertainty (that it would withstand shocks 
and ensure business continuity). In developed markets, credible information analyzers and 
verifiers as well as stable and independent regulatory, political, and legal institutions help 
mitigate such concerns. In emerging markets, firms have to overcome potential transaction 
uncertainty to engage in business despite the absence of such institutions.  
Reputation provides transactional confidence  
We propose that a firm’s reputation can help to both overcome and capitalize on transaction 
uncertainty. Voids in institutions ensure that in emerging markets, there is no guarantee that a 
firm will abide by its agreements, or continue to operate in the face of environmental shocks. 
To engage in transactions with a firm, stakeholders have to believe the firm will both honor 
its promises and withstand shocks. A favorable reputation can act as a credible signal that 
helps mitigate uncertainty and provides transactional confidence. We propose that, in 
emerging market settings, reputation consists of prominence, perceptions of quality, and 
resilience. 
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For instance, Savannah Maziya, group CEO of Bunengi Holdings (one of Africa’s 
leading infrastructure and mining conglomerates), emphasized how the firm’s success in its 
first mining project led to prominence that cascaded into enormous opportunities over time: 
“I think getting our first mine was a game-changer…Then that just leapt into other 
projects and leapt into other opportunities. We are today who we are based on 
that first project, because it proved to everybody…that we could do this kind of 
business.” 
 
Guillermo Murchison, CEO of Murchison S.A. Estibajes y Cargas (a large port 
services and warehousing firm based in Argentina), summed up the importance of a 
reputation for quality of products, behaviors, and adherence to promises in operating in an 
environment replete with institutional voids:  
“They [clients] trusted me; they knew we always did everything the right way. 
The company still enjoys a great reputation. People value those things.”  
 
Finally, Antonio Madero (Founder, Chairman and CEO of Sanluis Corporation, a 
leading Mexico-based automotive parts maker), emphasized the importance of having a 
reputation for resilience, or the ability to withstand challenging and unexpected shocks, built 
through the firm’s response to prior challenges: 
“After the crisis of 2009, the orders increased and our growth rate over the 
following 5 years is 21 percent per year. Why? Because we have the trust of our 
clients who saw how we managed to overcome the crisis.” 
 
Keshub Mahindra, the former Chairman of the Mahindra Group (a leading multinational 
Indian business group), echoed this sentiment, noting that the firm’s reputation stemmed from 
the fact that stakeholders saw, “in spite of very difficult conditions, we are able to do 
business.” In emerging markets, perceived resilience is critical because a firm’s continual 
existence is certainly not something taken for granted. As Arturo Acevedo, President of 
Grupo ArcelorMittal, noted:  
“Argentina is a very unpredictable country… and we are managing to survive, 
which is certainly no easy thing.” 
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As the above quotes illustrate, firms with prominence, a reputation for delivering 
quality products and engaging in quality behaviors (including honoring agreements), and 
having resilience (including surviving prior environmental challenges), can build 
transactional confidence.  We thus offer the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: In emerging markets, a favorable reputation – comprising 
prominence; beliefs about quality; and beliefs about resilience – can help firms 
overcome and capitalize on informational voids by reducing potential transaction 
uncertainty. 
 
Transaction confidence operates through defensive and offensive mechanisms  
We propose that, by providing transactional confidence, reputation affects firm outcomes 
through two mechanisms. By reducing potential transaction uncertainty, a favorable 
reputation can allow a firm to (1) overcome institutional voids by buffering against threats 
(the defensive mechanism); and (2) capitalize on institutional voids by generating new 
opportunities (the offensive mechanism).   
Defensive mechanism: Buffering against threats  
First, a favorable reputation can buffer a firm against threats by allowing for 
flexibility in its responses. By providing transactional confidence, a favorable reputation can 
convince counterparties that a firm is acting in an appropriate and trustworthy way. In 
emerging markets, firms will have to adapt in response to threats and shocks to survive; a 
favorable reputation can ensure adaptations are not seen as signals of behavioral drift that 
dissuade future transactions.  
For example, when the Mahindra Group’s auto division had to lay off 500 people due 
to weak demand, there were no riots or turmoil because the community trusted that there 
must have been a good reason for the layoffs, given the reputation that the Mahindra Group 
had cultivated with the local community over time. This was despite India’s history of 
industrial strife, often marked by labor union militancy. A riot or turmoil would have severely 
disrupted the Mahindra Group’s ability to exploit its business model and engage in 
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transactions. Keshub Mahindra, former Chairman of the Mahindra Group, contrasted his 
firm’s peaceful layoff against another factory’s more turbulent layoff that was marked by 
resentment-fueled strikes. He emphasized how the group’s favorable reputation allowed it to 
buffer against a demand shock by giving it more flexibility and leeway to adapt and operate:  
“Last week, we laid off 500 people because of [low] demand in the auto 
industry. Apart from a little thing in the papers, no one cared because…they 
trust us. They know that we would not have done this unless we had good 
reasons. The building of trust and confidence has been our most useful tool.” 
   
Julio Werthein, Founder of Grupo Werthein (one of the largest diversified business groups in 
Argentina), also emphasized how his firm’s reputation shielded it from domestic crises that 
lowered general investor trust in Argentina. When asked whether domestic crises jeopardized 
his operations abroad, Werthein emphasized that: “That was no problem, because people 
trusted our management.”  As the quotes illustrate, in emerging markets, a firm’s reputation 
can allow it to respond to threats without inspiring stakeholder doubts about its intentions or 
its future trajectory.
8
  
Offensive mechanism: Capitalize on new opportunities  
Second, a favorable reputation can allow a firm to attract new customers and partners, 
and thus generate new opportunities. For instance, Adi Godrej, Chairman of the Godrej 
Group (one of India’s largest diversified business groups) described how the group was able 
to leverage its reputation to enter into transactions with customers in new industries:  
“We did… better than most Indian businesses because we were among the few 
[that] had a strong brand…we used the family name…in the branding. Our 
cupboards were called Godrej Cupboards, our refrigerator was a Godrej 
Refrigerator, and our locks were Godrej Locks... So the Godrej brand ran 
across many categories…it became a well-known name. For example, our real 
estate development business has leveraged the brand strength very well. That 
helps us considerably.” 
 
                                                          
8
 Another example that underscores this point is Khanna, Palepu, and Herrero’s (2007) case study on Tetra Pak 
Argentina, a multinational food packaging and processing company of Swedish origins. When the Argentinian 
currency collapsed, Tetra Pak was still trusted by the market due to its favorable reputation as a firm that acted 
in accordance with its promises. As the case notes, this played a key role in its survival. 
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A favorable reputation can also allow firms to develop relationships with new partners. 
For instance, Suresh Krishna, chairman of Sundram Fasteners (the largest maker of industrial 
fasteners in India and a constituent company of TVS Group, one of India’s leading industrial 
business groups), recalled the importance of reputation from his affiliation with TVS group 
that allowed him to get his “foot in the door” when he first launched Sundram Fasteners. 
Despite having the technological capabilities, it was the reputation of TVS, a trading and 
distribution oriented business group, that allowed Krishna to gain the access to transaction 
partners to exploit his technology and resources and thus successfully build a manufacturing 
oriented business. Krishna recalled:   
“It was a great platform. TVS had already been in existence for 50 years in 
1962…That helped a lot in at least getting your foot into the door…Saying they 
knew who I was, and they knew TVS meant something.  I didn’t have to 
explain the group; everybody knew the group.  It was a tremendous advantage.  
The minute they saw TVS, they’d say, ‘Okay,’ and all doors opened…If I had 
been an independent, stand-alone, fresh out of school entrepreneur, I think the 
journey would have been 100 times more difficult.”  
 
Additionally, Fazle Hasan Abed, the founder and Chairman of BRAC (a Bangladesh-
based development organization that is the largest NGO in the world by number of 
employees), emphasized that BRAC’s positive reputation was instrumental in facilitating 
growth from Bangladesh into new geographies worldwide.    
“We have a reputation of being able to deliver whatever we promise, and that 
helps us...As soon as we went to Afghanistan [from Bangladesh] in 2001, 
everybody flocked to fund BRAC, because we had the reputation.” 
 
In the examples above, leaders emphasized that the extent to which they capitalized on 
an opportunity—whether in a new market or with new partners—depended on how much 
counterparties (businesses or consumers) knew them, trusted the quality of their products and 
behaviors, and believed in their ability to overcome shocks and crises. This notion is 
consistent with studies showing that business groups with strong reputations are most likely 
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to capitalize on new opportunities that emerge during policy shocks that result in market 
liberalization (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998).  
Thus, we propose that in emerging markets, reputation―by reducing transaction 
uncertainty―buffers firms against threats, and enables them to capitalize on new 
opportunities. We summarize this in the following two-part proposition:  
Proposition 2a: In emerging markets, by reducing potential transaction uncertainty, 
a favorable reputation buffers a firm against threats.  
 
Proposition 2b: In emerging markets, by reducing potential transaction uncertainty, 
a favorable reputation enables a firm to capitalize on new opportunities. 
 
Defensive and offensive mechanisms increase quantity of transactions 
We propose that the defensive and offensive mechanisms of reputation increase the quantity 
of a firm’s transactions, allowing a firm to activate its conventional resources.9 By buffering 
against threats, the defensive mechanism can provide a firm with more time to exploit 
existing business opportunities, increasing its quantity of transactions. For example, the 
Mahindra Group’s reputation provided the firm with time to exploit its business 
opportunities, even when other firms in India were unable to do so. Keshub Mahindra noted:  
“Overseas, when you have a fall in demand you can lay off people…. In India, you 
can hardly ever do that, so even if you are facing a low-demand situation, you are 
stuck with the cost of labor.”   
 
In this case, Mahindra Group’s favorable reputation uniquely allowed it to adapt to negative 
demand conditions by laying off people, so that it could continue to operate and exploit its 
business model to increase transactions. In contrast, competitors without such a favorable 
reputation would be greatly constrained from adapting via layoffs, since labor union 
militancy in response to a layoff could severely disrupt operations.  
                                                          
9
 For simplicity, we focus on quantity and abstract away from the potential impact on the “quality” of a firm’s 
transactions. For brevity, we can think of a notion of “quality-adjusted” quantity, which we do not explore in 
this study but see as a promising area for further research.  
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By allowing a firm to capture new business opportunities through attracting new 
customers and partners, offensive mechanisms can directly increase the quantity of 
transactions that a firm captures. More transactions to execute means greater utilization of 
otherwise idle resources. For example, when Godrej Security Safes leveraged its reputation to 
move into the refrigerator sector, new refrigerator orders meant Godrej had to increase its 
utilization of its conventional resources in order to fulfill these new transactions.  
We thus propose that these mechanisms allow firms to increase the quantity of their 
transactions under both positive and negative macro-economic conditions. The leaders 
interviewed had steered their firms through positive and negative times, across periods of 
economic boom and bust. During challenging economic cycles, the defensive mechanism 
allowed their firms to engage in adaptation, including downsizing, without compromising 
stakeholders’ confidence. During times of boom, the offensive mechanism allowed the firms 
to attract new customers, partners, and engage in further expansion. We summarize this in the 
following proposition:  
Proposition 3: In emerging markets, by buffering against threats and allowing for 
new opportunities, a favorable reputation increases a firm’s quantity of 
transactions. 
 
Reputation as a meta-resource that moderates conventional resources   
We thus propose that reputation is a meta-resource that moderates the degree to which a firm 
can activate its conventional resources. In emerging markets, because high potential 
transaction uncertainty discourages transactions, having strong inputs and capabilities for 
producing output is not enough to ensure a firm will attract customers and partners. We 
suggest that, unless a firm is able to leverage its reputation to attract counterparties in the 
absence of institutional guarantors, its resources and capabilities―no matter how 
powerful―will remain idle and unused. This notion was succinctly summed up by Rahmi 
Koç, Chairman of Koç Holding (Turkey’s largest diversified business group):  
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“Perception is most important. You can have good items, but if your brand is 
not associated with quality and history, you do not get satisfactory margins.” 
 
As this quote illustrates, the inter-related nature of reputation’s underlying components – 
prominence (in Koç’s words, “perception”), perceptions of quality (“quality”), and resilience 
(“history”)—can facilitate survival.  
We conceptualize reputation as a meta-resource because of its high order ability to 
activate, leverage, and moderate other resources. The use of the “meta” label is analogous to 
work on organizational routines differentiating between lower-order operative routines and 
higher order decision procedures―meta-routines― consisting of routines for changing 
conventional routines (Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Similarly, in evolutionary economics, 
meta-routines are viewed as the genes of an organization―higher-order routines that affect, 
constrain, and influence generic firm activity patterns (Nelson and Winter, 1982). We 
summarize this idea with the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: In emerging markets, a favorable reputation acts as a meta-resource 
that allows a firm to activate its conventional resources. 
 
Cumulative effects: Reputation as a basis for long run survival in emerging markets  
Having proposed the ways that reputation enables firms to overcome and capitalize on 
institutional voids in volatile institutional environments, our hypotheses give rise to an 
additional question: if reputation is so important, how can it be a source of sustained 
survival? In other words, why should there exist a heterogeneous distribution of reputation 
across firms, instead of a situation of competitive parity, where all firms invest in reputation 
and thus with competition the heterogeneity in reputation disappears over time? Reconciling 
insights from the interviews with theories of competitive advantage, and the resource-based 
view in particular, we propose that reputation has persistent and sticky effects because, first, 
acquiring reputation without an extant base of reputation is exceedingly difficult, and second, 
once acquired, reputation begets more reputation.  
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First, we suggest that, to acquire reputation, firms not only have to be able to produce 
good quality output, but also needed to focus on managing perceptions of resilience. That is, 
firms have to convince stakeholders that they are likely to persist and thrive over time. For 
example, Rafael Guilisasti Gana, Vice Chairman of Viña Concha y Toro (Latin America’s 
top producer of wine), noted the complexity involved in building reputation. As his statement 
indicates, doing so involved not just making quality wines, but also influencing stakeholder 
perceptions of the firm as one deeply embedded in its industry and value chain:  
“To meet that requirement, you need to make quality wine… but… it’s not 
just about explaining quality, but also about aspiring to international 
recognition and endorsement―not from consumers themselves, but from the 
entire distribution chain: wine critics, restaurants and on- premise 
consumption.” 
 
Acquiring reputation without an extant base of reputation is likely to be difficult. 
Research suggests that it may involve contributions to the public good. Because this process 
is complex, time consuming, expensive, and require expertise to execute, it may be difficult 
to imitate (e.g., Henisz et al., 2014; Khanna and Palepu, 2004). Often, a firm’s early 
reputation may thus emerge through luck. For example, Adi Godrej (Chairman of the Godrej 
Group) noted that the reputation of the Godrej name was actually initially propelled by a 
lucky shock:  
“We were helped tremendously by a major explosion in the Bombay docks 
during the Second World War. There was a ship carrying ammunition which 
exploded in the docks, and it created major damage in the Fort area of what 
was then Bombay. A lot of offices suffered destruction and many of the 
British safes were destroyed, whereas almost all the contents of our safes were 
perfectly alright. And that led to great success later for our safe business.” 
 
After this, Godrej noted that the Godrej name became well-known, and because of its 
reputation for quality, the firm was able to successfully expand its product portfolio into 
many new and different industries. This example not only illustrates the role that luck often 
plays in bestowing reputation, but also suggestively highlights the causal direction of 
reputation in affecting outcomes.  
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Although it might be difficult to acquire initially, we also propose that, once initiated, 
reputation can be reinforced in cascading positive feedback loops. Having a favorable 
reputation might lead to more opportunities, which can further increase reputation, which can 
lead to even more opportunities, and so on. For example, Antonio Madero, Founder, 
Chairman and CEO of Sanluis Corporation, noted how having a level of favorable reputation 
helped build more reputation via self-reinforcing positive feedback loops:  
“Everything is public in the business world. If you are successful in your own 
business…then you acquire an outstanding reputation…and people will pay 
attention to what you have to say…We are growing in what we do globally; 
we are adding product lines directed toward the same type of customer 
because we already have a very good reputation.”  
  
Thus, acquiring and developing reputation is likely to be a time dependent and 
socially complex process. While this might make reputation difficult to acquire, it also 
suggests that reputation is potentially a durable source of sustained advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993). Moreover, the potentially reinforcing nature of reputation underscores its 
importance in emerging markets. As its effects compound over time, reputation can build 
ever-growing confidence that a firm will overcome institutional voids; that is, over time, 
reputation can become an increasingly credible signal reducing potential transaction 
uncertainty. We thus propose that a firm’s reputation can serve as a core basis of strategy for 
competing in emerging markets. We synthesize via the following proposition:   
Proposition 5: In emerging markets, a favorable reputation can be a source of long 
term survival. 
 
DISCUSSION  
In this paper, we theorize reputation as a driver of long term survival in emerging markets. 
We propose that, in emerging markets, a favorable reputation can act as a meta-resource that 
moderates whether a firm can activate its conventional resources, and illuminate the 
mechanisms that connect reputation to long run survival. Specifically, we propose that 
reputation is crucial for survival in emerging markets, because it allows firms to overcome 
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and capitalize on the transaction uncertainty created by institutional voids. We propose that 
reputation is a unique strategic construct in emerging markets in that, through its offensive 
and defensive channels, it can be beneficial regardless of whether a firm is on the upswing or 
downswing of a volatile cycle. Furthermore, reputation’s socially-complex and intangible 
nature implies both a high barrier to imitation and reinforcing feedback loops that facilitate 
increasing returns over time; we propose that reputation can thus allow firms to survive and 
persist over generations. 
In developing this theory, we contribute to a growing literature on institutional voids 
in emerging markets (e.g. Guillen, 2000; Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014; Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung, 2013; Mair, Martí, and Ventresca, 2012; Siegel, 2007). Our 
conceptualization of reputation as a meta-resource provides a mechanism-based view into 
one way that institutional voids might be mitigated and leveraged as a source of advantage. 
At a more general level, we contribute to knowledge on how intangible assets affect 
organizational outcomes, responding to Pfarrer et al.’s (2010: 1145) call for scholars to 
develop theory that “precisely specify and capture the type of intangible asset studied and the 
context within which its effects are investigated” in order to gain “greater insights into the 
mechanisms through which intangible assets provide competitive advantages.” In so doing, 
we augment existing theories of strategy that stress the importance of continuous change. For 
example, research on the importance of dynamic capabilities emphasizes that firms can adapt 
to changing environments across time by changing, organizing, and recombining resources, 
capabilities, and routines (e.g. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Helfat et al., 2009). We propose 
reputation can be an antecedent that allows firms to engage in change. We suggest that 
reputation, at its core, provides stability (maintaining a favorable reputation engenders 
transactional confidence due to the stable informational cues it provides); we propose that it 
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is this very stability that provides a spring-board for firms to reorient resources to adapt to a 
changing environment. The example of the Mahindra Group illustrates this idea: when 
Mahindra had to lay off 500 people to adapt to changing market conditions, they were able to 
do so without interference from the community because of their favorable reputation, while 
layoffs by other firms elsewhere were met with unrest and angst.   
Building reputation 
Our theory also managerial implications for firms hoping to build reputation in emerging 
market settings. Given the importance of reputation for firm outcomes, understanding how 
reputation is built has direct implications for firm strategy. However, research on how firms 
develop reputation is surprisingly underdeveloped. Our theory suggests that, in emerging 
markets, firms might benefit from a reputation not only for producing quality products, but 
also for withstanding environmental shocks. This implies three general―though not mutually 
exclusive nor collectively exhaustive―approaches for firms without reputation to attain 
reputation: (1) through serendipity; (2) through providing a solution to a pressing need 
(thereby filling an institutional void); or (3) through partnerships. Further research elucidating 
and testing these mechanisms can have important implications for knowledge on firm 
strategy in emerging markets.  
Building reputation through serendipity 
In developed markets, firms without reputation can build up reputation by performing 
well―that is, demonstrating their quality―in certification contests (Rao, 1994). However, 
the challenge for firms trying to build reputation in emerging markets is that these settings 
lack precisely the information analyzers and certifiers that can credibly evaluate and rate 
firms (Khanna and Palepu, 2010). Moreover, in these settings, having high quality products is 
not enough: firms must also engender beliefs in their ability to persistently deliver such 
quality in the face of a shifting environment. Our data suggest that one way firms attain and 
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develop reputation is through serendipity: exogenous shocks that allow firms to demonstrate 
their adherence to promises, and their ability to survive despite uncertainty. For instance, in 
the Godrej example, the Bombay mine explosion was a major news event, and because 
Godrej’s safe was the only safe that survived the explosion, it allowed the firm to not only 
gain salience (being known), but also become known for resilience (the ability to survive 
shocks). The channel for acquiring salience and demonstrating quality here is the prominence 
of the exogenous news event: a mine explosion that gained the attention of many 
stakeholders. We see great potential for future research to explore the role of luck in building 
reputation and engendering success and survival in emerging market settings. 
Solution-driven approach: Filling institutional voids  
While we propose that a favorable reputation can help firms overcome institutional 
voids, our theory also suggests that filling an institutional void can be another general 
approach that helps firms build reputation. Because institutional voids affect a large number 
of stakeholders, a firm that fills a void will likely gain the stakeholders’ attention. And 
because filling the void will also require adherence to promises and stability, it will likely 
build and influence stakeholders’ perceptions about the firm’s potential for future survival.  
One example of this from our interviews is provided by BRAC, the Bangladeshi-
based organization that is now the world’s largest NGO. BRAC acquired a reputation in the 
economic development community for being a judicious steward of funds and an entity that 
would credibly deliver on its promises. The formation of this reputation goes back to the 
organization’s founding. In the early 1970s, as the area that is now known as Bangladesh 
reeled from a devastating cyclone in 1970 and a formal separation from Pakistan in 1971, 
BRAC’s founder, the former head of Shell in the region, obtained a grant from the British 
foundation, Oxfam, to build houses for rehabilitation purposes.  He ensured that his small 
team over-delivered on his promises by building more houses than promised and by offering 
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to return unused money. Since then, BRAC has invested over more than four decades in 
being seen, among other things, as a credible entity. In the emerging markets environment 
where it is hard to assess the credibility of potential arms-length transaction partners, BRAC 
acquired a reputation by filling this institutional void that transcends conventional industry 
boundaries.   
Partnership-driven approach  
A third general approach to building reputation might be through leveraging the 
existing reputation of an established firm to use for one’s own benefit, including through a 
mutual arrangement such as an affiliation or alliance. For example, when Sundram Fasteners 
was launched from scratch, its founder leveraged its affiliation with the reputable TVS 
Group, reminding every counterparty he interacted with that his venture was affiliated with 
TVS, which provided the founder great access to potential suppliers and customers. Prior 
research has suggested that new firms can build reputation by partnering with multiple, well-
established firms (e.g. Stuart et al., 1999). We propose that doing so might be especially 
important in emerging market contexts, where affiliation can signal that a firm is likely to 
keep its promises and is likely to survive environmental maleficence. However, the difficulty 
of this approach is that acquiring affiliation and partnership with reputed establishment firms 
is not a trivial matter (since establishment firms often have little incentive to affiliate with an 
unknown entity). In our data, for example, we observe that reputation-building affiliations 
and partnerships are often driven by kinship ties.  
 Cumulative effects of building reputation 
More generally, our theory suggests that firms in emerging markets should prioritize 
building reputation as a strategic objective early in their development. The cumulative effects 
of reputation suggest timing is particularly important: once a firm has a stock of reputation, it 
becomes easier to develop even more reputation. While we outlined above three general 
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approaches for acquiring reputation, each approach is challenging. Luck is unpredictable and 
hard to plan for, filling an institutional void is inherently complicated (if it were easy, there 
wouldn’t be a void), and getting a reputable firm to commit to a partnership is difficult (since 
it requires an agreement where both parties have aligned incentives). Thus, because it is 
difficult to acquire reputation, and since reputation is socially complex and thus needs to be 
cultivated over time, having an early start might be key. We see great scope for future 
research to further unpack and integrate these divergent approaches.    
OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH 
The purpose of our study was building theory; we hope that improvements in the availability 
and quality of data will eventually allow scholars to empirically test our theoretical 
propositions. Our study cannot reliably dismiss all possible alternative explanations (for 
instance, the existence of processes or mechanisms driving both reputation and longevity), 
and cannot entirely account for potential endogeneity or reverse causality. To test the 
proposition that reputation is a meta-resource, empirical studies in institutionally-weak 
environments should interact a firm’s reputation measure with its measure of conventional 
resources in estimating performance, while controlling for alternative explanations and 
reverse causality. We propose that the coefficient on the interaction term should be positive. 
We also hope future research will build on and extend our ideas. First, we do not 
explore the potential downsides of favorable reputation, or the potential benefits of a negative 
reputation. Future studies could explore whether firms with negative reputations can navigate 
institutional voids in alternative ways (for instance, through crony capitalism) to achieve the 
same outcomes (for instance, accessing capital from the state instead of markets (Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2006)).  Second, we do not consider what occurs when a firm has a different 
reputation among different stakeholders: for example, a positive reputation with consumers 
and suppliers, but a negative one with environmental activists. We thus see the development 
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of a deeper understanding of the “liability of reputation” (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rhee and 
Haunschild, 2006), and the relationship between favorable and non-favorable reputations in 
emerging markets, as important areas for future research. Third, because our data was 
constructed through theoretical sampling, we cannot examine whether there are firms that 
have survived over the long run despite lacking strong favorable reputations, and whether 
there are firms that failed in spite of possessing strong favorable reputations. Future research 
can further refine our theory by examining instances where a favorable reputation did not 
forestall failure, and the lack of favorable reputation did not constrain success.  
Additionally, while we propose that reputation can be broken into three component 
factors―prominence, perceptions of quality, and resilience―we cannot separate their 
isolated effects on a firm’s overall reputation, or on its long-term survival. Many of the 
respondents emphasized the importance of the cumulative, reinforcing nature of these 
components in driving long-run survival. In theorizing the effects of reputation as a cohesive 
construct, we thus follow qualitative studies that aggregate multiple codes into an over-
arching construct that serves as the basis for theorizing (e.g. Huy, 2011; Fauchart and 
Grueber, 2011). Reputation’s components are likely reinforcing, and characterized by 
nonlinear relationships such as self-reinforcing feedback loops. Moreover, stakeholder action 
may be driven by their overall, aggregate perceptions of a firm. Nonetheless, we hope our 
propositions can motivate future studies testing the impact and relative importance of each 
component, and on disentangling their complex relationships. When, if ever, will resilience 
matter more than prominence and perceptions of quality? Does this vary across the stages in a 
firm’s, industry’s, or emerging market’s state of development? 
Finally, by considering only emerging market settings, we do not explicitly theorize 
the comparative effects of reputation in emerging versus mature markets. The idea of 
reputation as a meta-resource is consistent with studies in mature markets showing that 
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reputation can help a firm realize the potential of its other resources (e.g. Dollinger, Golden, 
and Saxton, 1997; Stuart et al., 1999; Turban and Cable, 2003; Love and Kraatz, 2009; Stern 
et al., 2014). Nonetheless, our model suggests that reputation’s ability to mitigate and 
capitalize on institutional voids would be significantly less transparent (and at the theoretical 
extreme, even redundant) in developed markets, where mature market institutions (such as 
information analyzers, credibility enhancers, functional adjudication mechanisms, ex-post 
watchdogs et cetera) reduce the risks of transacting with unknown parties. Structurally, this 
suggests that the greater the extent and degree of institutional voids in an environment, the 
greater the upside of reputation’s meta-resource effects will be. We see potential for large-
scale quantitative studies to compare the effects of reputation on survival or performance in 
emerging markets and in more developed settings.  
We thus shed light on the importance of an underappreciated construct (reputation) in 
an under-theorized setting (emerging markets) over an unusual period (the long run), in the 
hopes of motivating future research. Given the fluctuations of successes and failures in 
modern emerging economies, the increasing interdependence between emerging and 
developed economies, and the lack of theory beyond developed market settings (Bettis et al., 
2014), developing academic theory on how success can be attained and sustained in 
institutionally-underdeveloped environments has never been more important. We hope our 
proposed theory is a first step in motivating further research and practice in this vein.
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Figure 1. Proposed anatomy of reputation as a meta-resource in emerging markets  
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[ONLINE SUPPLEMENT] Appendix 1: Interviews analyzed and summary statistics  
Name Position  Industry  Country 
Kwasi Abeasi CEO, Africa Investconsult Ltd. Financial Services Ghana 
Fazle Hasan Abed Founder and Chair, BRAC Microfinance, 
Development 
Bangladesh 
Arturo Acevedo President, Grupo ArcelorMittal―Acindar Steel, Mining Argentina 
Abbas Akbarally Chairman, Akbar Brothers Diversified Sri Lanka 
Hamdi Akin Founder and Chairman, Akfen Holding Construction, 
infrastructure 
Turkey 
Roberto de Andraca Chairman, Cap S.A. Steel Chile 
Roberto Angelini Rossi Chairman, Empresas Copec S.A. and AntarChile S.A. Petroleum, Forestry, 
Fishing 
Chile 
Gülsüm Azeri Group President, Şişecam; CEO, OMV Petrol Ofisi 
(current) 
Chemicals and glass; 
Petroleum 
Turkey 
Alberto Bailleres CEO, Grupo Bal Diversified Mexico 
Rahul Bajaj Chairman, Bajaj Group Diversified India 
Hakeem Belo-Osagie Chair, United Bank for Africa (currently with Etisalat 
Nigeria) 
Financial services Nigeria 
Alberto Benavides de la 
Quintana 
Founder and Chairman, Compañía de Minas 
Buenaventura 
Mining Peru 
Jorge Born Former President, Bunge y Born (now Bunge Limited) Agribusiness, Food Argentina 
Cem Boyner CEO, Boyner Holding Retail Turkey 
Federico Braun President and Chairman, Sociedad Anónima Importadora 
y Exportadora de la Patagonia (SAIEP) (La Anónima) 
Supermarkets Argentina 
Manu Chandaria  Chairman and CEO, Comcraft Group Steel and Aluminum Kenya 
Ricardo Claro Chairman, Claro Group (defunct; main company, 
Compañia Sud Americana de Vapores S.A.) 
Shipping Chile 
Nalli Kuppuswami Chetti Chairman, Nalli Silk Sarees Textiles, retail India 
Paulo A. Cunha Chair, Grupo Ultra Petroleum and Natural 
Gas; Chemicals 
Brazil 
Felipe Antonio (Tony) 
Custer 
CEO, Corporacion Custer Food, Chemicals Peru 
Hubert Danso CEO and Vice Chairman, Africa Investor Financial Services, 
Media 
South 
Africa 
William Engels Member of the Board, Bunge Limited Agribusiness Argentina 
Andre Esteves CEO, BTG Pactual Financial Services Brazil 
Dionisio Garza Medina  Former President and CEO, Alfa S.A.B. de C.V. Diversified Mexico 
Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter Chairman, Gerdau Advisory Council; former CEO, 
Grupo Gerdau 
Steel Brazil 
Adi Godrej Chairman, Godrej Group Diversified India 
Jose Grana Miró Quesada Chairman, Graña y Montero Construction, Real Estate Peru 
Rafael Guilisasti Gana Vice Chairman, Vina Concha y Toro S.A. Wine Chile 
Yusuf Hamied CEO, Cipla Pharmaceuticals India 
Tomás Hudson President, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) (now part 
of Akzo Nobel) 
Chemicals Argentina 
Ranjan Kapur Executive Chairman, Ogilvy & Mather India Advertising India 
Rahmi M. Koc  Honorary Chairman, Koç Holding Diversified Turkey 
Suresh Krishna Chairman, Sundram Fasteners Metal products India 
Ritu Kumar Founder, Ritika Private Limited Fashion, textiles, retail India  
Amalia Lacroze de Fortabat President and Chair, Loma Negra Cia Industrial 
Argentina S.A. (Now belongs to other investors) 
Cement Argentina 
Agustin Legorreta Former President, Banco Nacional de Mexico Financial Services Mexico 
Erling Lorentzen Former CEO, Aracruz Celulose Pulp and Paper Brazil 
Andrónico Luksic Craig Vice Chairman, Banco de Chile and Quiñenco S.A. Banking, Mining Chile 
Antonio Madero Founder and CEO, SANLUIS Corporación S.A. de C.V Automotive Parts Mexico 
Jorge Marín Correa President, Compañía General de Electricidad s.a. (cge) Electricity, Natural Gas Chile 
Keshub Mahindra Former Chairman, Mahindra Group Diversified India 
Carlos Wizard Martins Founder, Grupo Multi Education  Brazil 
 
 
Note: Names listed in alphabetical order by surname; Spanish names ordered by first surname (apellido paterno). Analyzed 
interviews represent the complete set of all available interviews at time of analysis (January 2016); interviews are publicly 
available through the HBS Creating Emerging Markets Project (see full citation in references page).  
 
Summary statistics of interview data at time-of-interview*: 
 
Data    
Firms 
  
Mean Age 
Median Age 
Max 
Min 
73  
74 
190 
12  
Respondents  Mean Age 
Median Age 
Max 
Min 
69 
69 
93  
44  
Most represented countries 
 
Argentina 
India 
Chile 
Brazil 
Turkey 
11 
11 
10 
8 
8 
Most represented industries Diversified 
Financial services 
Retail   
16 
8 
4 
* Firm age estimates calculated based on firm founding year, discovered through archival research. In some cases, defining a 
precise firm founding year is difficult due to corporate development events or unclear origin markets. Thus, some founding years 
are approximations based on archival research findings. 
Name (continued) Position (continued) Industry (continued) Country 
Savannah Maziya CEO, Bunengi Holdings; Chair, Parsons Brinckerhoff 
Africa 
Infrastructure, Mining South 
Africa 
Eliodoro Matte Larraín President, Empresas CMPC S.A. Pulp and Paper Chile 
Eva Muraya Group CEO, Brand Strategy and Design Ltd Advertising and 
Marketing 
Kenya 
Guillermo Murchison CEO, Murchison, Estibajes y Cargas S.A. Shipping and Logistics Argentina 
Prithvi Raj Singh Oberoi Executive Chairman, EIH Limited Hospitality, Tourism India 
Victor Gbolade Osibodu Chairman and CEO, Vigeo Limited Diversified Nigeria 
Husnu Ozyegin Chairman, FIBA Holding Financial Services Turkey 
Luis Alejandro Pagani CEO, Grupo Arcor Food Production Argentina 
Horst Paulmann Kemna President, Cencosud S.A. Retail Chile 
Nii Quaynor Chair, Network Computer Systems and Ghana Dot Com Internet Provider Ghana 
Prathap Reddy Founder and Chairperson, Apollo Hospitals Healthcare India 
Guler Sabanci  Chair, Sabancı Holding Diversified Turkey  
Manuel Sacerdote Regional President, BankBoston (Argentina) (now ICBC) Financial Services Argentina 
Ricardo Salinas Pliego CEO, Grupo Salinas Diversified Mexico 
Pedro Moreira Salles Chair, Itaú Unibanco Financial Services Brazil 
Daniel Servitje Montull CEO, Grupo Bimbo Food Production Mexico 
Roberto Setubal President and CEO, Itaú Unibanco Financial Services Brazil 
Reinaldo Solari Chairman, S.A.C.I. Falabella Retail Chile 
Ratan Naval Tata Chairman, Tata Trust; Former Chairman, Tata Group Diversified India 
Luiza Helena Trajano President, Magazine Luiza Retail Brazil 
Murat Vargi Founder and Chair, MV Holding Diversified Turkey 
Rodolfo Viegener Former President, FV S.A.; Former Chairman and CEO, 
Ferrum S.A. 
Faucets and plumbing 
products 
Argentina 
Sven Von Appen Chairman, Ultramar Agencia Maritima Shipping and Logistics Chile 
Gordon & Morine 
Wavamunno 
Chairman and CEO (Gordon) and Executive Director 
(Morinne), Spear Group 
Diversified Uganda 
Julio Werthein President, Grupo Werthein Diversified Argentina 
Augusto Felipe Wiese de 
Osma 
CEO, Grupo Wiese Diversified Peru 
Selcuk Yasar Founder and Honorary Chairman, Yaşar Holding Diversified Turkey 
 
 
[ONLINE SUPPLEMENT] Appendix 2: Subset of data structure 
 
 
First-Order Codes Second-Order Themes 
Formal planning 
Emergence 
Luck  
Planned vs. emergent strategy 
New opportunities 
Change of action due to new 
information/circumstance 
New idea and practice 
New political activity 
Adaptation 
Perceived mistake 
Perceived success 
Perceived luck 
Sense-making 
Adaptive learning 
Business learning (early formative) 
Professionalization 
Learning 
Brand awareness / Prominence 
Quality of products/services 
Perceived stability/resilience 
Reputation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[ONLINE SUPPLEMENT] Appendix 3: Illustrative examples of coding of reputation 
 
Interviewee  Quote First-Order Code  
Adi Godrej 
Chairman, Godrej Group 
(one of India’s largest 
diversified business 
groups) 
  
“Fortunately, being in consumer products, if your brand is doing reasonably well, 
and if it is growing, then you don’t get affected by setbacks of other kinds…Many 
Indian groups which were very strong say in the 1950s or in the 1960s, some of 
them almost disappeared because the socialist regime created difficulties for 
growth…We were fortunate that the brand carried our success quite strongly” 
Prominence 
 
 
Sir Fazle Hasan Abed  
Founder, Chairman, 
BRAC 
(largest NGO in the 
world by number of 
employees) 
 
“We have a reputation of being able to deliver whatever we promise, and that 
helps us in also finding money in Africa to try and develop programs... As soon as 
we went to Afghanistan [from Bangladesh] in 2001, everybody flocked to fund 
BRAC, because we had the reputation. And so we started getting funding from 
sources that we didn’t know, we didn’t want, so all kinds of money started 
flowing in. We became very quickly the largest NGO in Afghanistan.” 
Quality  
Federico Braun 
President of La Anónima 
(one of Argentina’s 
largest supermarket 
chains) 
“There are no mysteries in the supermarket business...In fact, in world retailing 
history, innovations are quickly imitated…La Anónima is seen as a company that 
meets its commitments, has longtime and loyal employees – and this is important 
– and keeps its word. However simple they may seem, these qualities are not that 
easy to find. I don’t believe technology is a distinctive factor, like bar codes, or 
scanning…”  
 
Resilience 
 
Jose Grana Miró Quesada 
Chairman of Grana y 
Montero (the oldest and 
largest construction 
company in Peru) 
“Considering that the company had already secured some success, we set out to 
find the reasons underlying that success and to determine what we had to preserve 
moving forward…So, we conducted a survey with our customers, workers and 
suppliers…[and found that] clients relied on a company like Graña y Montero on 
account of its reputation, because it was a serious business. That was something 
we had missed…Our goal is not to be the largest or the richest, but rather the most 
reliable company in the industry. Our surveys have shown that clients make no-
bid decisions based on reliability. And if you are the most reliable company, your 
prestige will help you grow your business.” 
 
Resilience 
 
 
